

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 10233 151701Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----071222 160304Z /20

R 151410Z JUL 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9892

S E C R E T MOSCOW 10233

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PINT US UR
SUBJECT: DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE N US-SOVIET RELATIONS

REF: MOSCOW 10082

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF REMARKS ON JULY 9-13
DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE BY NORMAN COUSINS DURING JULY 14
CALL (ACCOMPANIED BY REED OF KETTERING) ON AMBASSADOR.
(VIEWS OF SONNENFELDT AND DOTY SENT SEPTTEL.) END SUMMARY.

1. MIDDLE EAST: DURING WORKING SESSION ON LANGUAGE FOR
JOINT COMMUNIQUE SISCO BLUNTLY WARNED SOVIETS THAT FAILURE
TO PLAY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN ME COULD RESULT IN DISASTROUS
CONSEQUENCES. SOVIETS PROTESTED HE WAS PRESENTING
ULTIMATUM. COUSINS WARNED THEM NOT TO INJECT CUBANS INTO
ME AND GOT SAME REPLY.

2. ANGOLA: IN SIDE DISCUSSIONS SISCO DESCRIBED ANGOLA
AS "CHEAP VICTORY" FOR SOVIETS AND CALLED FOR REMOVAL
OF CUBANS. SOVIETS ADMITTED THEY HAD GAINED
NO PROFIT THERE, AGREED CUBANS SHOULD LEAVE AND
IMPLIED THEY WERE GETTING THEM OUT.

3. HUMAN RIGHTS: IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS, SOVIETS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 10233 151701Z

TOOK TWO LINES:

A) ASKING HOW PRESIDENT CARTER COULD MISCALCULATE
THIS ISSUE SO BADLY, ARBATOV INSISTED THAT PRESIDENT
HAD HARMED HIS OWN CAUSE, PRODUCED A DOWNTURN IN
DETENTE, STRENGTHENED HANDS OF SOVIET HARDLINERS, AND
COMPLICATED BREZHNEV'S TASK OF CONSOLIDATING HIS
DETENTE POLICY IN ORDER TO HAND IT ON INTACT

TO HIS SUCCESSOR. HARDLINE OPPONENTS OF DETENTE WERE ARGUING "WE TOLD YOU SO": OBJECTIVE OF US DETENTE POLICY HAS BEEN TO UNDERMINE USSR AND PRESSURE SOCIALIST SYSTEM, A VIEW WHICH "MOST (BUT NOT ALL) AROUND THIS TABLE DO NOT SHARE".

B) LONG TIME TRUSTED SOVIET SOURCE (UNNAMED) ASKED WAS PRESIDENT CARTER'S REAL PURPOSE TO HELP SOVIET DISSIDENTS? IF SO, "WE ARE BAFFLED" BECAUSE PRESIDENT'S TACTICS HAD PUT BREZHNEV IN POSITION WHERE HE COULD NOT TAKE AN ELIQUATING ACTION AND RUN RISK OF APPEARING TO BACK DOWN. IF PRESIDENT WAS REALLY INTERESTED IN PLIGHT OF DISSIDENTS WHY DIDN'T HE USE PAST PROVEN METHOD OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATION SUGGESTING A MEETING IN WHICH HUMAN RIGHTS COULD BE INCLUDED ON LIST FOR EXCHANGE OF IDEAS. (COUNSINS ADDED HE PERSONALLY AGREES; HE SEES EVIDENCE OF SOVIETS TIGHTENING UP IN MANY WAYS. VOZNESENSKIY AND OTHER SOVIET WRITERS ARE VERY CONCERNED, FOR CURRENT TENSION OVER HUMAN RIGHTS DRIVES THEM INTO ORTHODOX POSITIONS THEY DISLIKE. LIKE OTHER US PARTICIPANTS COUSINS DID HIS BEST TO EXPLAIN THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE RUNS DEEP IN US HISTORY, THAT PRESIDENT DOESN'T EXPECT OTHERS TO ABOLISH THEIR SOCIAL SYSTEM, BUT FEELS COMPELLED TO SPEAK OUT. BUT EVEN SOVIET AMERICAN SPECIALISTS REMAIN "MYSTIFIED".

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 10233 151701Z

4. ARBATOV: LIKE SONNENFELDT AND OTHERS, COUSINS FOUND ARBATOV PROFOUNDLY TROUBLED MAN, IN BLACK MOOD, DRINKING NOTICEABLY MORE THAN USUAL. PART OF THIS IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO RECENT LOSS OF HIS MOTHER. BUT HE SEEMS DEEPLY HURT AND UPSET BY USG STANCE AND IN COUSINS' VIEW IS IN TROUBLE, PROBABLY BECAUSE HE HAD ADVISED BREZHNEV THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD NOT UPSET SOVIET VERSION OF DETENTE AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN US POLICY. (ONE SOVIET SOURCE SAID ARBATOV HAD "MISLED US".)

5. BRZEZINSKI: ALL SOVIETS CHARACTERIZE BRZEZINSKI AS THE DEVIL IN THE WHITE HOUSE POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS.

6. WHAT TO DO? COUNSINS SUGGESTED AN "END RUN" ACCOMPANIED IN A FEW RECIPROCAL POSITIVE MOVES BY EACH SIDE. HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO ISSUE AN EXTRA 1500 EXIT VISAS FOR JEWS IN RESPONSE TO THE "PROPER SIGNAL". HIS RECOMMENDED SIGNAL: PRESIDENT SHOULD SEND PRIVATE MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV STATING THAT

--HE HAD NO INTENTION OF PRESSURING BREZHNEV
INTO DEPARTING FROM LATTER'S INTERPRETATION OF
DETENTE, OF UPSETTING DETENTE OF THE SOCIALIST
SYSTEM;
--HE NEEDS A LITTLE HELP FROM BREXHNEV ON HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUE;
--HE HOPES SOVIETS WILL APPRECIATE THAT HE TOOK
B-1 DECISION IN GOOD FAITH;
--THAT THEY MEET AND TALK LIKE TWO GOOD POLITICIANS.
(WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT
PRESIDENT HAD MADE THESE POINTS BUT THAT BREZHNEV
SEEMED ADAMANT THAT A MEETING WITHOUT DOCUMENTS TO
SIGN WAS USELESS.)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 10233 151701Z

6. SHCHARANSKIY: IN SEPARATE TALKS WITH SEVERAL
SOVIETS INCLUDING ARBATOV, ZHUKOV, AND MOSTOVETS,
COUNSINS HAD STRESSED VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF
A TREASON TRIAL, WHICH WOULD BE FIRST OF ITS KIND
SINCE STALIN'S TIME.
IN PRIVATE TALKS, MOSTOVETS (WHO WAS SURPRISINGLY
FORTHCOMING DURING THIS CONFERENCE COMPARED WITH HIS
PREVIOUS PERFORMANCES SINCE 1964) SAID THE CASE
HAD MOVED VERY FAR, THE EVIDENCE WAS VERY STRONG
AND HE DIDN'T KNOW THAT COULD BE DONE. WHEN
COUNSINS VENTURED POSSIBILITY OF EXILE, MOSTOVETS
REPLIED THAT MAYBE THERE WOULD BE "NO EXECUTION."
"CHERKOVSKIY" (CHAYKOVSKIY OF LITGAZ?) WHO COUSINS HAS KNOWN FOR
18 YEARS AND WHO HE CONSIDERS AS A GOOD FRIEND TOLD HIM
THE EVIDENCE AGAINST SHCHARANSKIY IS SOLID, VERY
STRONG, NOT FABRICATED. (NOTE: OBVIOUSLY SHAKEN
BY THESE REMARKS COUSINS WONDERED OUT LOUD WHETHER
PRESIDENT HAD "SPOKEN OUT TOO HASTILY" IN CATEGORICALLY
DENYING ANY CIA CONNECTION WITH SHCHARANSKIY. IN
ANY EVENT, HE URGED IT WAS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT
NOW TO "PUMP SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS" INTO US-SOVIET
RELATIONS.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, MEETING REPORTS, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 15-Jul-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MOSCOW10233
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770253-0727
Format: TEL
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770753/aaaabtsd.tel
Line Count: 159
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 0f4ac06a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 77 MOSCOW 10082
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1849708
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE N US-SOVIET RELATIONS
TAGS: PINT, US, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/0f4ac06a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009